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I.

INTRODUCTION

The subject of this Article is the role of defense counsel in the
suppression of truth in criminal cases. To understand this role, it is
necessary to explore briefly the nature of the legal profession.
The special privileges associated with membership in a learned
profession, such as the law, are not conferred by society primarily to
benefit the members of that profession or their clients. Special status is
conferred because of the belief that the society as a whole will benefit
from the existence of a specialized group which by education and experience is able to perform functions that a progressive society needs.'
Society has conferred upon members of the legal profession a monopoly over the rendition of legal services. The people have also chosen,
thus far, to abstain from all but the most general regulation of the profession, delegating to it the power of self-regulation and providing it
with public authority to support its efforts. Inherent in such a decision
is the assumption that the profession, having been accorded the privileges of monopoly and of self-regulation, will engage in self-regulation
* Chancellor and Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1951, University of Buffalo;
J.D. 1953, LL.M. 1955, LL.D. 1978, Georgetown University. The author's views on the subject
were presented in a speech given in 1976 at Mercer University and in 1977 at The Judge Advocate
General's School
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969) [hereinafter cited as CPR];
ABA PROiEcT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (Approved Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].

1. MacIver, The Social Sinfftcance of ProfessionalEthics, 297 ANNALS 118 (1955); Wade,
Public Responsibilitiesof the LearnedProfessions, 21 LA. L. REv. 130, 131-36 (1960).
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designed to ensure that these services will be rendered in a manner that
will best serve the public interest.
Thus far, that assumption has not proven entirely accurate. The
failure of the legal profession adequately to meet this public expectation does not, of course, suggest that the legal profession is in jeopardy
of extinction in our lawyer-dominated society. It does suggest that the
public may decide to abandon its traditional attitude of abstention and
greatly intensify public regulation of the profession.
Few within the profession question the wisdom of effective selfregulation. The real issue is the kind of self-regulation that will best
serve the public interest. The American Bar Association in its Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) attempts to divide the process of
self-regulation into two quite different general tasks-what Raymond
Marks and Darlene Cathcart have described as the task of monitoringn
2
ethical conduct and the task of maintaining quality of performance.
The principal standard for monitoring performance is Disciplinary
Rule 6-101, which forbids a lawyer from handling alone a legal matter
that he knows, or should know, he is incompetent to handle, prohibits
the handling of a legal matter without preparation adequate under the
3
circumstances and forbids neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him.
The following discussion is confined to the other area of self-regulation, the ethical standards of the profession, which deal directly with
the problem of what conduct should be prohibited and what should be
permitted. The specific focus will be.on permissible conduct by defense counsel in a criminal trial, although many of the observations
that follow will be applicable to other kinds of representation and to
other processes.
The proper balance between zealous representation and the obligation of the lawyer to the court and to the public is not a new problem.
It festers in the background, erupting periodically as during the debates
surrounding Charles Phillips' defense of Courvoisier a century ago, 4
the discussion concerning the views of Mr. Curtis a generation ago5 and
6
the celebrated lecture and article by Dean Freedman a decade ago.
2. Marks & Cathcart, Discioline Within the Legal Profession: Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974
ILL. L.F. 193, reprintedin RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION No.
5 (1974).

3. CPR D.R. 6-101.
4. See D. MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER (1973).
5. See C. CURTIS, IT'S YOUR LAW (1954).
6. Freedman, ProfessionalResponsibilityofthe CriminalDefense Lawyer: The Three Hardest
Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469 (1966). The questions faced by Dean Freedman were:

(1) Is it proper to cross-examine for the purpose of discrediting the reliability or credibility of an adverse witness whom you know to be telling the truth?

(2) Is it proper to put a witness on the stand when you know he will commit peIjury?

Vol. 1978:921]

ROLE OF COUNSEL

Normally, little happens in the aftermath of such debates. Thus,
shortly after the discussion inspired by Dean Freedman's article, the

CPR, while concentrating upon the litigator and virtually ignoring the
office lawyer, nevertheless managed to deal only obliquely with most of
the basic issues that counsel regularly face in criminal litigation.7 Uncharacteristically, however, the American Bar Association Standards
Relating to the Defense Function,8 approved in 1971, did meet many of

the issues directly and, motivated in part by strong feelings on the part
of the Chief Justice,9 specifically rejected Dean Freedman's proposed
solutions to what he has called the Three Hardest Questions.' ° Unlike
the CPR, the Standards, which were approved by the Council of the

Section on Criminal Justice and the House of Delegates, thus far lack
the binding effect of law, but it would be naive to believe that the view
of the organized bar will be ignored by disciplinary authorities called
upon to interpret the more general language of the Code." Further
consideration is now being given to amending the Code to12conform its

mandates to the more specific language of the Standards.

The 1971 Standards did not end the debate. In 1974 Judge Marvia E. Frankel, in his Cardozo lecture, The Search for Truth: An
(3) Is it proper to give your client legal advice when you have reason to believe that the
knowledge you give him will tempt him to commit perjury?
Id. 1469.
The first question is answered affirmatively. An attorney, according to Dean Freedman, is
obligated to cross-examine such truthful witnesses because to do otherwise would "inevitably"
impair the confidential attorney-client relationship. Id. 1475. The confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship, the likelihood that the pejured testimony would appear anyway even if
the attorney withdrew, the difficulties faced by attorneys representing indigent clients in attempting to withdraw, the inappropriateness of shifting the ethical problem to the judge through a
motion to withdraw if the intended perjury comes to light only at trial (but see text accompanying
note 95 infra for a contrary view) and the damage done to the client by failing to argue zealously
the client's version of the facts, see note 100 infra and accompanying text, all lead Dean Freedman
to the conclusion that it is proper to put the perjurious witness on the stand. Freedman, supra, at
1476-78. The third question is also answered affirmatively, since "to decide otherwise would not
only penalize the less well-educated defendant, but would also prejudice the client because of his
initial truthfulness in telling his story in confidence to the attorney." Id. 1481-82.
7. For instance, CPR D.R. 7-106(C) sets forth seven disciplinary rules for trial conduct.
8. ABA STANDARDS.
9. See Burger, Standards of Conductfor Prosecution and Defense Personnel: .4 Judge's

Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRiM. L. Rav. 11 (1966).
10. See note 6 supra.
11. See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973), discussing the effectiveness of counsel. "Counsel should be guided by the American Bar Association Standards for the
Defense Function. They represent the legal profession's own articulation of guidelines for the
defense of criminal cases." Id. at 1203.
12. Review of the Code is being conducted by the ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of
Professional Standards with Dean L. Ray Patterson of Emory University School of Law serving as
Reporter.
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Umpireal View, 3 echoed Judge Walter V. Schaefer's earlier question 14
as to whether the present adversary system is serving the public interest
in the ascertainment of truth. 15 As a tentative remedy for his concerns,
Judge Frankel recommended some fundamental changes in the manner in which counsel should function. 6 Shortly thereafter, Dean
Freedman published his book modifying and expanding upon his thesis of a decade ago and engaging in a running rebuttal of the ABA
Standards, particularly the views of the Chief Justice. 17
The purpose of the following discussion is to explore the problem
again, but from a somewhat different perspective. The beginning point
is concern with the difficulties inherent in determining the obligation of
counsel to his client and society. The Article rejects the notion that the
obligation to client justifies counsel in serving as a "mouthpiece" in the
sense of permitting counsel to behave as a client might wish to behave
himself if he possessed the requisite talent. It also rejects the notion that
it is the role of counsel to assist in every way in the ascertainment of all
the facts relevant to a determination of guilt or innocence and, if guilt
is found, to the imposition of an appropriate sanction. Rather, the Article argues that the appropriate balance is best determined by examining the purposes of the criminal process and the degree to which
13. Frankel, The Searchfor Truth:An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975). See
also Freedman, Judge Frankel'sSearchfor Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060 (1975); Uviller, The
Advocate, The Truth, andJudicialIackles:A Reaction to JudgeFrankel'sIdea, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1067 (1975).
14.

W.

SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CONVERGING

CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES (1967).
15. Frankel, supra note 13, at 1032.
16. These changes included requiring an attorney (unless prevented from doing so by a privilege reasonably believed to apply) to report to the court and opposing counsel the existence of
relevant evidence when the attorney does not intend to introduce it, to prevent the making of
untrue statements and the omission of material facts by the attorney's client or witness, and to
question witnesses with the purpose of developing the whole truth. Id. 1057-58.
17.

See M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975).

See also the differing views of Peter Schuck and Alvin B. Rubin in Can It be Ethical to Let
Your Client Lie on the Stand?, 6 JURIS DOCTOR, Feb. 1976, at 49. Other contributions to the
debate are Babcock, Problemsin ProfessionalResponsibility,55 NEB. L. REV. 42 (1975); Callan &
David, ProfessionalResponsibilityand the Duty of Confidentiality Disclosureof Client Misconduct
in an Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332 (1976); Glazer, fat Are Limits ofLawyer's
ProfessionalConduct in Defending a Client?,50 FLA. B.J. 332 (1976); Polster, The Dilemma of the
PerfiriousDefendant: Resolution Not Avoidance, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 3 (1977); Redlich,
Lawyers, the Temple and the Market Place, 30 Bus. LAW. S-65 (1975); Reichstein, The Criminal
Law Practitioner'sDilemma: What Should the Lawyer Do "hen His Client Intends to Testify
Falsely?, 61 J. CRiM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCl. 1 (1970); Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers'
Ethics in Negotiation,35 LA. L. REV. 577 (1975); Sevilla, Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Ethical Perilsofthe CriminalDefense Lawyer, 2 NAT'L J. CRiM. DEF. 237 (1976); Shaffer, Christian
Theories ofProfessionalResponsibility,48 S. CAL. L. REV. 721 (1975); Wolfram, ClientPerjury,50
S. CAL. L. REv. 809 (1977); Essay, Three DiscussionsofLegal Ethics, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 452, 458
(1977); Rotunda, Book Review, 89 HLv. L. REv. 622 (1976).
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different defense tactics contribute to or impede the achievement of
those purposes.
The Article advances the view that such an evaluation will lead
most dispassionate observers to the conclusion that the scales are at
present tilted too much in favor of conduct likely to preclude the jury's
ascertainment of the relevant facts. It proposes that the most appropriate way of dealing with the problem is primarily through re-examination and alteration of evidentiary and procedural law, not through
ethical proscriptions that would preclude counsel from asserting rights
that are available to his client under law. In s6me instances, changes
or clarifications are needed in the CPR; in others, the reasons for permitting certain conduct should be articulated in a manner calculated to
convince the public.
II.

TRUTH AS A VALUE IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL

Our criminal process has undergone radical change in the last century. In the middle of the nineteenth century relevant evidence of guilt
was admissible without regard to the manner in which it was obtained,"8 the accused was not permitted to testify in his own defense 9
and most defendants were unrepresented.2 ° Defendants charged with
serious crimes are now almost invariably represented; they may testify;
and relevant evidence is sometimes suppressed if obtained unlawfully.
The process has changed substantially, and the ethics of advocacy
can be properly understood only in the context of the procedure that
now exists. Although few would like to return to the nineteenth century model, many are concerned about the twentieth century process as
it has developed in recent years. Changes in criminal procedure during the last two decades and many current ideas about legal ethics combine to raise serious questions whether the role of defense counsel as we
now understand it really is in the public interest, and whether the public will or should remain quiescent if the legal profession accepts such a
conception of the role of counsel as a model for professional deportment, at least in the absence of a more persuasive rationale than has
been thus far presented. There can be little doubt that any defense
counsel would at times be remiss in his duties under existing law if he
18. But see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (enunciation of the federal exclusionary rule). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (application of the exclusionary rule to

the states).
19. 2 J. WIGMORE,

ON EVIDENCE

§§ 575, 579 (3d ed. 1940).

20. Indeed, at earlier common law, although the defendant had "the right to the advice and
assistance of counsel, he could not be represented by counsel at his trial." W. CLARK, HANDBOOK
OF CIMIAL PROCEDURE § 157, at 506 n.30 (2d ed. 1918).
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did not take action that would make the disclosure of the truth less
likely in a particular case. It is less clear what criteria should be utilized
in determining when such conduct is preferred and when it is not.
Judge Frankel makes a strong case for his conclusion that truth is
ranked "too low among the values that institutions of justice are meant
to serve."'" Efforts aimed at the ascertainment of truth must be central
to the role of counsel in any system for the resolution of disputes.22
Conduct that is intended to, or is likely to, result in the suppression of
truth, or which is designed to mislead a court or jury or to facilitate a
falsehood, should be presumptively improper. Such conduct, ifjustifiable at all, may be defended in terms of the degree to which it furthers
some other valid objective of the system. Other objectives of the system must themselves be re-examined if in concert they preclude the
ascertainment of truth.
The propriety of courtroom conduct does not depend upon its importance to counsel in justifying a fee, its value to a client in obtaining
an acquittal or its symbolic value to a movement or cause. Unlike the
ascertainment of truth, these cannot be said to be fundamental values
of the institutions of justice. Nor may a lawyer's conduct be justified
solely by the (partially inaccurate) observation of Justice Frankfurter
that "ours is the accusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial system, ' '23
and that the adversary system will be weakened unless counsel is permitted to undertake whatever action will improve the chance of his client to prevail in the case.
A trial is not an athletic contest in which each side should have an
equal chance to win. A defendant should win only when he is innocent or when the state cannot prove his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt by competent evidence according to law. A defendant whose
guilt can be proved by competent evidence has no inherent right to an
acquittal. He may be acquitted because the prosecution errs, or for
some other reason not related to his guilt, but not because of any sense
of entitlement.
In most cases the resources available to a defendant are much less
than those available to the state, and in some cases they may border on
the inadequate. The rules of procedure at a criminal trial reflect an
21. Frankel, supra note 13, at 1032. But cf G. HAZARD, ETHICS INTHE PRACTICE OF LAW
128-29 (1978) ("The real value of the adversary system ... may not be its contribution to truth
but its contribution to the ideal of individual autonomy," Id. 129).
22. "The basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth .. " Tehan v. United States
ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).

23. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949). Certainly, the decision to arrest, the decision to
charge and the proceedings before a grand jury more closely resemble components of an "inquisitorial system."
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allocation of power between the individual and the state. But a criminal trial is not a process designed to reallocate power. Some believe

that a conviction is so pointless, so calculated to do nothing but harm to
the convicted man and so little good for anyone else, that the most
socially conscious and ethical lawyer can wholeheartedly feel it is his
duty to secure an acquittal in any permissible way. 4 Such lawyers
need to be reminded that members of the bar are not Platonic Guardi-

ans. In a democracy, the people determine what conduct merits the
imposition of criminal sanctions and the nature of those sanctions. So
far they have not delegated the power to determine such issues to individual lawyers.
A half century ago Judge Learned Hand commented that Ameri-

can criminal prodecure "has been always haunted by the ghost of the
innocent man convicted."2 This is still true today and, on the whole,
is probably fortunate. It should not obscure the fact that anyone with
experience in the criminal courts knows that many, if not most, defendants brought to felony trial are guilty.2 6 Only a small percentage of
people who commit serious crimes are caught, and a high percentage of
those who are arrested either plead guilty to lesser charges or are
beneficiaries of a decision by the prosecutor not to charge them with a
felony. Others are released at preliminary hearings or by grand juries.
Still others plead guilty in exchange for favorable sentences. Those
who remain in the dock at the beginning of a felony trial are the final
product of an administrative screening system2 7 which, with all its
24. See Griffiths, Ideology in CriminalProcedureor a Third "Model" ofthe CriminalProcess,
79 YALE L.J. 359 (1970).
25. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
26. See C. ALLEN, LEGAL DUTIES 255 (1931), quotedin A. GOLDSTEIN & L. ORLAND, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 4 (1974). "The magnanimous disposition of our law towards the accused is the
more striking because it is perfectly well known to every intelligent person that the vast majority
of accused persons are guilty of the crimes with which they are charged." Id. Indeed, the operation of a responsible police force and the effective screening of cases by prosecuiors, preliminary
magistrates and grand juries should avoid the specter of any substantial number of innocent persons suffering the trauma of a felony trial. This in no way suggests that any particular accused
should not be entitled to a presumption of innocence.
The fallacy that indictment means guilt is not reduced by the fact that the police are
honest and competent and that the probabilities are therefore great that the accused
But the overriding considerations are
committed the crimes charged against them....
that reliance is on rational procedure to determine guilt or innocence, and that, whatever
police competence and the statistics suggest, we cannot form any intelligent judgment on
this basis with reference to any particular case.
Hall, Objectives of FederalCriminalProceduralRevision, 51 YALE L.J. 723, 729 (1942), quoted in
A. GOLDSTEIN & L. ORLAND, supra, at 7.
27. For a graphic representation of the relative volume of cases at various stages throughout
the criminal justice system, see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 8-9 (1967), reprintedin H.
VETTER & C. SIMONSEN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 6-7 (1976).

DUKE LAW JO UXNAL

[Vol. 1978:921

vices, assures us that the innocent defendant is a rarity, the exceptions
noted by Professor Borchard 8 and the Franks29 notwithstanding.
Given the probability that the defendant is guilty, the defense
counsel, unlike the television lawyer, cannot expect that a prosecution
witness will confess on cross-examination or that a diligent investigation will reveal the true culprit. Indeed, he will often admit to himself
that his client will win only if counsel is successful in preventing the
truth from being disclosed. A hypothetical case may illustrate these
concerns better than rhetoric.
III.

ARMED ROBBERY IN FARMVILLE

On October 15, 1977, two men robbed a small branch bank in
Farmville, State of Justice. Farmville, with a population of 4,000, is
the largest town in Kenan County, a rural area of 400 square miles in
the eastern part of the state.
On October 17, 1977, one of the six deputy sheriffs of Kenan
County received an anonymous telephone call informing him that the
proceeds of the robbery could be found in back of a refrigerator in a
mobile home located in a trailer park in the suburbs of Farmville. The
deputy did not know the identity of the caller and had no clues to the
identity of the robber. He proceeded to the trailer park, located the
mobile home, knocked and, when he received no answer, entered. A
sack with the name of the bank stenciled on it, and containing the
money taken from the bank minus about $300 was found in the place
described by the anonymous informant. The deputy ascertained the
identity of the occupant of the mobile home from the manager of the
trailer park. The mobile home was staked out, but no one attempted
to enter it. The occupant, John Smith, whose lease on the mobile
home had two weeks to run, was arrested several days later in another
city. He was wearing a new two-hundred-dollar suit when arrested.
Smith was brought to the sherifis office in Kenan County. He was
informed that the robbery proceeds had been found in the mobile
home he had been leasing. He was also informed that he could remain
silent and that anything he said could be used against him. He was not
informed of his right to counsel. No force, threats or promises were
used. Smith admitted that the mobile home was leased to him and
that he owned a car similar to that used in the robbery. He stated that
he had left Farmville before the robbery and had never intended to
return.
28. See E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT. ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1932).
29. See J. FRANK & B. FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957).

Vol. 1978:921]

ROLE OF COUNSEL

The next morning Smith was brought before a district judge who
informed him of his right to remain silent, his right to counsel, his right
to bail and his right to a probable cause hearing. Smith said he would
retain counsel. He was unable to post bond. The case was continued
for seven days for a probable cause hearing.
Four days later, the district attorney obtained an indictment from
a grand jury. Under the law of the state, the indictment mooted the
scheduled probable cause hearing. The next day the deputy sheriff,
without notifying the district attorney, conducted a lineup at which one
witness, a Ms. Young, identified Smith as the driver of the getaway car.
She could not state whether he had ever been in the bank. The lineup
was conducted fairly, except that Smith was not represented by counsel.
At his arraignment, Smith informed the court he could not afford a
lawyer. The court entered a plea of not guilty and appointed Tim
Jones to represent him. Jones talked to the district attorney and then
went to the jail to interview Smith. He introduced himself and told
Smith that before asking him what happened he would first tell him
something about the law relating to his case. He then explained to
Smith that if he and someone else had agreed to rob the bank he would
be technically guilty if he were the driver of the getaway car, although
he had never entered the bank. On the other hand, he would be innocent if he had simply agreed to drive a friend to the bank, had no
knowledge of the friend's intention to rob it and had driven him away
without knowing the bank had been robbed. In addition, he certainly
would not be guilty if he were not involved at all. Unfortunately, the
state had two witnesses who would testify that he was in the car. Jones
went on to tell Smith that if he admitted that he was involved in the
bank robbery, Jones would continue to represent him but that he was
doubtful whether he could call Smith as a witness in the case, and that
if he did not call Smith to the stand, the jury would probably find him
guilty.
Smith thought for a few moments and announced that he was the
driver of the car but was not involved in the robbery. His friend, Tom
Edwards, had asked him to take him to the bank. He knew nothing
about the sack behind the refrigerator and did not know where Edwards might be at the present time. He had told the police he was not
in Farmville because he was afraid the sheriff would "pin the crime on
him" if he admitted he was at the bank. Subsequently, Jones' investigation revealed two witnesses who had been with Smith in Farmville
on the day of the robbery.

930
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The deputy sheriff learned the identity of his informant before
trial. The informant had previously provided reliable information to a
number of law enforcement agents in the state but was unknown to the
deputy, who only recently had joined the office. The informant had
not identified himself because he had assumed that the deputy knew
him.
Jones promptly filed a motion to suppress the sack of money, the
admission of the defendant and the eyewitness testimony of Ms.
Young. At the hearing on the motion, it became clear that the court
was prepared to hold that a warrantless search of a dwelling based on
an anonymous tip by an informant not then known to be reliable was
unlawful and that evidence obtained as a result of such a search should
be admissible on the grounds of abandonment since the defendant had
left the mobile home with no intent to return. Jones argued that Smith
still had a right of occupancy by virtue of the lease and, consequently,
had not abandoned the mobile home or its contents. In support of the
motion, Smith testified that he was an occupant of the mobile home
and that he had left Farmville on the day after the robbery but had
intended to return before the lease expired. The judge stated that he
did not believe that the defendant had intended to return, but that he
was still troubled over the issue whether the abandonment doctrine
should apply when the defendant's lease had not expired. He clearly
indicated that he would like to sustain the search but felt that he could
not do so in the absence of authority.
There is no case in point in the State of Justice, but a recent case in
point had been decided by the supreme court of a neighboring state,
answering the exact issue in favor of the state. Jones knew of the case,
but both the district attorney and the judge were unaware of it. Indeed, there is no set of the foreign state reports within fifty miles of
Farmville. Jones did not inform the court of the case. The court suppressed the sack and its contents. Smith's admissions were also suppressed under Mfiranda v. Arizona.3 The court deferred decision on
the admissibility of Ms. Young's testimony until trial.
Prior to trial, Jones contacted some psychology students at a local
university. Impressed by the use of psychological profiles at the Joan
Little trial,3 1 they and their professor agreed to develop and administer
a questionnaire designed to develop a profile of jurors that could be
computer-programmed to indicate which personality types would be
most likely to vote for acquittal and which would be most likely to vote
30. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
31. See McConahay, Mullin & Frederick, The Uses of Social Science in Trials with Polilical
and Racial Overtones: The Trial of Joan Little, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 205 (1977).
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for conviction. Armed with this study, Jones conducted the voir dire
examination and exercised his challenges with the object of choosing
only those persons who were likely to acquit if the evidence developed
as he planned.
The district attorney called Ms. Young as his first witness. Ms.
Young testified out of the presence of the jury that she could not honestly say that her ability to identify the defendant as the driver of the
getaway car was unaffected by her identification at the lineup. On objection by Jones, the court excluded her testimony.
The district attorney then called Mr. Roberts, an elderly janitor.
He testified that he had been walking on the street near the bank and
had seen a person-whom he identified from a picture as being Edwards-run from the bank carrying a sack and jump into a car driven
by the defendant.
Utilizing the discovery procedure available under state law, Jones
had learned that fifteen years earlier Roberts had been convicted of the
offense of indecent liberties with a child. Jones had also learned that
Roberts had undertaken psychiatric treatment following his conviction,
married, moved to Farmville and lived a blameless life for over a decade. He was a janitor in a private school for girls, which would probably fire him if his conviction were revealed. The psychological profile
suggested that revelation of the prior conviction would have great impact upon several of the jurors. Under state law, the conviction was
admissible evidence relating to the credibility of the witness despite the
passage of time. Jones had also learned that Roberts usually wore
glasses, but on the morning in question was not wearing them. Jones
impeached Roberts by interrogating him concerning the prior conviction. He then interrogated him about the absence of his glasses, making it appear doubtful that he could have seen the events he described
on direct examination.
The prosecution rested, and the defendant's motion for a directed
verdict was denied on the ground that the jury could convict if it believed Roberts. The trial was recessed for the evening. Jones met
with Smith to discuss his testimony. The defendant suggested that it
might be better if he testified that he was not in Farmville on the day of
the robbery in view of the facts that his admissions, the sack and its
contents, and Ms. Young's testimony had not been admitted and that
Mr. Roberts' testimony had been generally discredited. Jones conceded that such testimony might be more helpful because it would be
consistent with his pre-trial statement and thus might provide a basis
for blocking the district attorney from admitting the pre-trial statement
under the guise of impeachment. But Jones reminded Smith that two
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people had seen him in Farmville on the day of the robbery and admonished him to tell the truth. Smith asked if the district attorney
knew about the two witnesses, and Jones answered in the negative.
Smith laughed and said, "You can depend on me."
The next morning Jones called Smith to the stand and, after some
preliminary questions, asked him whether he was in the car at the bank
on the day of the robbery. Smith answered in the negative, adding
that he had left town previously to seek employment in another county,
never intending to return. Jones asked several other general questions,
approached the bench, and requested that the jury be excused. The
judge granted the request. Jones then moved to withdraw, indicating
that his motion was based on ethical considerations that he was not at
liberty to disclose. The court denied the motion with the statement,
"Do the best you can. This trial has already taken two days and if I
appoint another lawyer, he will be faced with the same problem."
The jury returned and Jones continued his examination, eliciting
from Smith testimony that he was in no way involved in the robbery,
did not know Edwards, was employed in another county when arrested, and had used his first pay check and some savings to buy the
clothes he was wearing at the time of his arrest.
On cross-examination, the district attorney attempted to admit
Smith's pre-trial statement to the deputy sheriff. When Jones objected,
the court ruled that its tenor was consistent with Smith's testimony on
direct examination and was thus inadmissible.
At this point the district attorney requested a recess for three days
on the grounds that Edwards had just been apprehended in another
state. The court granted the recess. Edwards was brought back to
Farmville and was charged with robbery but was released on bond.
He retained counsel and entered into an agreement with the district
attorney to plead guilty and to testify against Smith in exchange for the
promise that the district attorney would recommend a sentence not to
exceed five years.
When Jones learned that Edwards had made the deal, he talked
again with Smith. Smith responded to the news by informing Jones
that he was in fact a partner in the robbery and that Edwards might
testify to that effect. Smith then asked whether the district attorney
knew of the other evidence. Jones expressed surprise. The defendant
then informed Jones that a Mr. Anders knew about the robbery but
would not come forward voluntarily because "I have told him what my
friends would do to him." In addition, Smith revealed for the first
time that the gun used in the robbery was hidden over a false ceiling in
the mobile home.
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Utilizing discovery, Jones learned of the arrangements for leniency

in exchange for testimony between the district attorney and Edwards
and of Edwards' record of two prior felony convictions. Over the objection of Jones, Edwards testified that Smith was his confederate.
Jones impeached Edwards' testimony by cross-examining him concerning his prior convictions and his deal with the district attorney.
The district attorney offered as evidence Smith's earlier testimony
in support of his motion to suppress the bank sack and money that he
had left after the robbery with the intention to return. Jones objected
on the ground that a statement by a defendant in support of a motion
to suppress is inadmissible to prove guilt under the doctrine of Simmons v. UnitedStates. 2 The court sustained the objection. The district attorney then urged that the earlier testimony should be admitted
to impeach Smith's credibility. Jones' objection on the grounds that no
proper foundation had been laid on cross-examination was also sustained.
In closing argument, Jones argued that the janitor and Edwards
should be disbelieved and that Smith should be believed.
You may reach your own verdict.
IV. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF ETHICS AND EVIDENCE

At every stage of the proceeding, defense counsel was totally dedicated to preventing disclosure of the truth. Through the use of the law
and his talents, assisted by something less than brilliance on the part of
the prosecutor and, arguably, rulings by the trial court, he was extremely successful. It is, of course, difficult to conceive of all of these
ethical questions arising in a single case. The point is that most of
them arise frequently. The purpose of the hypothetical example is to
suggest the degree to which professional ethics and procedural law are
intertwined.
Many of what appear at first blush to be ethical questions actually
are questions about the wisdom of our rules of evidence and procedure.33 Many of the ethical issues are raised only when the problem is
put in terms of whether the defense counsel should use an existing procedure or rule of evidence to advance the cause of his client. If we do
32. 390 U.S. 377,394 (1968). But cf United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239 (1974) (protection
against self-incrimination through use of pretrial statements at trial does not extend to false statements of indigency that are knowingly made).
33. So long as the advocate in the American system is supposed to be at once a champion in forensic roughhouse and a guardian of the temple of justice, he can fulfill his
responsibilities only if he combines extraordinary technical skill with an unusually disciplined sense of probity. That seems to be asking too much of any profession.
G. HAzARD, supra note 21, at 135.
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not approve of what Jones is doing, the better course of action in several instances may be to change the rule of procedure rather than to
conclude that counsel should not utilize a rule favorable to his client,
even if the invocation of the rule tends to suppress the truth or mislead
the jury.
Presumably, all would agree that there are no ethical problems involved in Jones' agreement to represent Smith. Although he may well
have believed when he entered the case that Smith was guilty, guilty
people are clearly entitled to a lawyer, and Jones was acting in the
finest tradition of the profession in accepting the court appointment to
represent a client who could not afford counsel.34 It does not necessarily follow, however, that his belief in his client's guilt-or, indeed, his
later knowledge of his client's guilt-should have no impact upon the
manner in which he should behave in his representation. As to some
tactics, such as suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the
Constitution, counsel's knowledge or belief that his client is guilty may
be irrelevant. Other aspects of his behavior, such as suggesting to his
client advantageous versions of possible facts before soliciting his testimony, continuing to examine his client on the stand when he knew he
was lying, and urging the jury to disbelieve witnesses he knew to be
truthful and to believe his client, whom he knew to be lying, raise issues
far more controversial.
A.

Princplesfor Assessment of Courtroom Conduct.

The propriety of such tactics should be determined first by ascertaining the purposes of a criminal trial and then by determining the
responsibilities entrusted to defense counsel in achieving those objectives. The traditional objectives of our system for the adjudication of
criminal cases have been, first, the ascertainment of the truth of charges
against the defendant and of his defense to the charges; second, the
determination of an appropriate sanction if a defendant is found guilty;
and, third, the assurance that the fact-finding and dispositional
processes are performed in accordance with law, that is, that the law
and facts are fairly applied.35 An integral part of the fact-finding process is the responsibility of the state to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Our society recognizes that these objectives may not always
34. CPR E.C. 2-25, E.C. 2-29.
35. Some would concede an additional "nonrational" function, i:e., to provide a forum that
serves as a "vicarious avenue of emotional release" and that reflects the "conflict between conscious and animal desire," Hall, supra note 26, at 734; to provide a place to vindicate the public's
"sense of justice," id.; or to serve other "complex psychological functions," Goldstein, The State
andthe Accused"Balance afAdvantage in CriminalProcedure,69 YALE W. 1149, 1150 (1960).
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be achieved and expects that courts may arrive at "wise and informed"
decision more often than at the "truth," but still strives for the ascertainment of truth by means that are both fair and effective. More recently, we have added a fourth objective: that of deterring law
enforcement agents from violating legal statutes, rules and the Constitution. Under certain circumstances, this objective is met by suppressing some of the evidence obtained as a result of their
misconduct.36 The accomplishment of these objectives has been facilithen mandating, counsel for a defendant
tated by first permitting, and
37
in the absence of waiver.
The term "adversary system" is the generic description of the procedures and practices by which society has entrusted to counsel principal responsibility for the investigation and presentation of evidence
under evidentiary rules designed in general to ensure a high degree to
reliability.38 Society has placed responsibility upon counsel rather
than choosing another alternative, such as entrusting the evidence gathering and presentation process to court officials. This system has been
called the "only effective means for combatting this natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet
fully known.

' 39

Thoughtful people have disagreed about the objec-

tives of the adversary system-for example, whether it is a substitute
for out-of-court brawls, n0 or, in the words of Macaulay, whether the
fairest decision will emerge "when two men argue, as unfairly as possible, on opposite sides,"4 or whether, as Curtis urges, it exists primarily
36. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
37. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
38. See Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159 (1958).
The distinguished philosopher, Martin Golding, has attempted to categorize the justifications
for the adversary system most frequently asserted. See Golding, On the .4dversary System and
Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL LAW 98 (R. Bronaugh ed. 1978). Golding proposes three theories of
justification: (1) the truth finding theory, Ze., "an adversarial trial promotes decisions that are well
grounded on both the law and the facts because each side will, with partisan zeal, bring to the
court's attention all the material favorable to that side, and, therefore, no relevant consideration
will escape notice," id. 106; (2) the satisfaction theory, Le., that the system is justified by the
"psychological satisfaction that it gives to the parties in the case, in particular, 'the sense of having
had a day in court,'" id. 112; and (3) the protection theory, ie., that "irrespective of whether a
trial aims at truth discovery or something else, justice requires that the parties be given a fair trial
of their cause" and that a "fair" trial is either necessarily an adversarial trial or that, at least, "the
rights of litigants. . . are best protected under. . . a system in which each side is represented by a
partisan advocate," id. 116.
39. ProfessionalResponsibility:Report of the Joint Conference, supra note 38, at 1160.
40. See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 80 (1949).
41. Id.
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for the satisfaction of the parties.4" Presumably, most would recognize
that the adversary system is not an end in itself; it is a means to certain
ends-the objectives of our system for disputes resolution. The decision to permit counsel greater or lesser freedom in taking action on
behalf of a client should be judged primarily in terms of its impact
the adversary system, not in terms of its impact
upon the objectives 4of
3
on the system itself.

It must be recognized that all institutions and processes tend to
develop a dynamic of their own over the passage of time, and the ad-

versary system is no exception. In the lifetime of some of us, the presumption of innocence has developed from a shorthand expression

signifying that guilt in a criminal trial must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to an independent value enshrined in our legal system. 4
Thus, we talk of an accused being presumed innocent after a magistrate
has found probable cause justifying his arrest, after a judge has found
probable cause following a contested hearing to hold him for a grand
jury and after a grand jury has found probable cause justifying an indictment. 45 Likewise, the standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt

has been elevated from a highly desirable standard of proof in criminal
cases to a matter of due process of law in juvenile hearings.4 6 And so it

is with the adversary system. Over the passage of time the need to
encourage each counsel to fulfill his responsibilities has produced rules
42. C. CURTIS, supra note 5, at 3. See also Curtis, The Ethics ofAdocacy, 4 STAN. L. Rcv.
3 (1951).
43. Several of the theses underlying the adversary system have been studied recently. See
Thibaut, Walker & Lind, Adversary Presentationand Bias in Legal Declsionmaking,86 HARV. L.
REV. 386 (1972). These studies have been incorporated into J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975). See also Lind, Thibaut & Walker, Discovery and PresentationofEvidence in Adversary and Nonadversary Proceedings,71 MICH. L. REv.
1129 (1973).
44. Compare Taylor v. Kentucky, 98 S. Ct. 1930 (1978), Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
(1975) and Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895) with C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 647-49
(1954):
As applied to the accused, any assumption, or "presumption" of innocence, in the popuThe assumption of innolar sense of an inference based on probability, is absurd ....
cence which is reasonable in the absence of contary facts becomes quite unrealistic when
we include in the picture the facts that the person has been officially charged with the
crime and has been brought to trial.... The instruction on "presumption of innocence"
should, it seems, be regarded merely as a traditional but unnecessary amplification of the
instruction on the prosecution's burdens of evidence and of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. See also J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 551-76 (1898); 9 J. WIOMORE,
supra note 19, § 2511.
45. Concededly, the pre-trial process is less likely to screen out those whose guilt cannot be
proved according to law if inadmissible evidence is utilized in making probable cause determinations. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
46. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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and practices whose roots are in the adversary system itself rather than
in the objectives of our adjudicatory process.
Thus, in Hickman v. Taylor,47 counsel in a civil case was permitted
to deny opposing counsel access to nonprivileged information of a kind
that was relevant to a dispute requiring resolution. The decision was
justified in large part upon the ground that to place the obligation upon
each counsel to interview his own witnesses would encourage each to
perform the role expected of him, while permitting one counsel to do
nothing and then gain access to the statement procured by his adversary would, according to the Supreme Court, have a "demoralizing"
impact upon the legal profession. a Concededly, the decision was
based partly upon the assumption that if each lawyer is required to
perform his functions diligently, each will be in a better position to
present evidence to the jury and thus better serve the ends of the adjudicatory process.
Belief in the wisdom of the adversary system is engrained in the
legal profession. Much of modem procedural reform, such as simplified pleadings and discovery, has triumphed only after long arguments
that the adversary system, and hence our entire system for the resolution of disputes, will be weakened if the combatant model of the adversary system is modified, much less abandoned.
But conduct that is justified in terms of its importance to the adversary system obviously stands on different, and far less firm, footing
than conduct that finds its justification in the purposes of our system of
adjudication itself. When a practice is defended solely on the ground
that it is necessary to support the adversary system, it is fair to ask not
only whether it will further the adversary system, but what its impact
on the objectives of our adjudication process will be. If it is concluded
that it directly and significantly tends to frustrate one or more purposes
underlying our process of adjudication, the fact that it will advance the
adversary system should normally be no excuse. Indeed, it is arguable
that no practice should be defensible solely on the ground that it sup49
ports the adversary system.
47. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
48. Id. at 511. But cf. Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94 (1976) (allowing defense
counsel access to statement of key witness to prosecutor as provided for in the Jencks Act, 18

U.S.C. § 3500 (1976)).
49. There are those who reject the notion that significant ethical questions, such as the mode
of representation of a client who intends to commit peijury, can or should be resolved by deductive reference to a theory of the juducial process. See Essay, supra note 17, at 460. Instead, it is
suggested that the propriety of conduct can ultimately be judged by the lawyer alone, although the
lawyer who acts in defiance of a clear consensus that his conduct is wrong may be subject to

discipline. Id. 464-65.
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Motion to Suppressfor Want of ProbableCause.

Presumably, most will agree that Jones proceeded properly when
he moved to suppress admission of the sack and its contents, Smith's
admissions to the deputy sheriff, and Ms. Young's eyewitness testimony
identifying Smith. Indeed, a failure to do so would raise doubts about
his competence, his ethics, or both. Each motion was aimed at the
suppression of truth, but here it was unnecessary for Jones to balance
the value of the ascertainment of truth against the value of deterring
law enforcement agents from violating constitutional rights. The
Supreme Court has already performed this function by determining
that the conduct of the deputy sheriff violated the Bill of Rights and
that suppression of highly reliable evidence of guilt is the necessary
prophylactic.5 0 Jones' motions to suppress were directly related to one
of the purposes of our adjudicatory process as it now exists-deterrence
of wrongdoing by public officials. Jones, and some of us, may doubt
whether materially enhancing the likelihood of acquittal of a bank robber will in fact deter future deputy sheriffs of Kenan County from unlawful actions, particularly if they are unaware that their actions are
illegal. But that decision is for the courts, not counsel.
It appears that at least some members of the Supreme Court are
now also questioning whether the losses to the truth-seeking process are
really justified by the supposed deterrence. Recent decisions admitting
illegally obtained evidence to impeach credibility51 and in hearings
before grand juries, 2 and particularly Mr. Justice Rehnquist's recent
proposals that evidence should be suppressed only if it can be said that
the law enforcement officer knew or should have known that his action
was unlawful,53 certainly suggest concern over the degree to which we
have permitted other values to limit the truth-seeking potential of a
criminal trial. But that problem is for the courts, not Jones.
C.

Nondisclosure ofAdverse Authority.

Jones' conduct in arguing the motion to suppress is less defensible.
You will recall that he did not reveal to the court a case decided in
another jurisdiction directly in point on the issue of abandonment, although he had reason to know that the court would have liked to have
known about the case before determining whether the fourth amend50. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
51. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
52. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
53. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
496 (1976) (Burger, CJ., concurring); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
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ment had been violated. Jones' decision not to reveal the case from a
sister state seems justified, at least by negative implication, by the language of the CPR, which in Disciplinary Rule 7-106(B) provides:
In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer shall disclose:
(1) Legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to him to
be directly adverse to the position of his client and which is not disclosed by opposing counsel.54

This test is too narrow. Counsel should have the obligation of
bringing to the attention of the court any authority about which he
reasonably believes the court would like to know before deciding the
matter before it. This was the professional obligation of counsel
before the Code" and far better reflects the appropriate obligations of
an officer of the court. If Jones had informed the court of the unfavorable decision, he would, of course, have remained free to argue that it
was not binding, that it was incorrectly decided or that factual differences between the decided case and the one before the court made the
precedent distinguishable. Counsel should not be free to withhold precedent from the court in the hope of a favorable judgment when he
appreciates that the case might influence the judge to rule against him.
The ineptitude or lack of diligence of opposing counsel or of the
court is no justification for increasing the likelihood that a judge will
incorrectly ascertain or apply the law. Neither is the understandable
attitude of the client that his counsel should take no action that "will
help the other side." There should be occasions, and there are, as in
response to a demand for discovery, when counsel is obligated to act in
a way that reduces his client's chances for acquittal.5 6 The appropriate

role of a lawyer should not be and is not determined solely by what is
in the interests of his client. Certainly he should explain to his client
why he is revealing a case prejudicial to his argument. But his obligation to assist the court in ascertaining and applying the correct principle
of law should be paramount. It is paramount, under the Code, when
there is a case in point in his jurisdiction; it should also be paramount
when there are cases in point in other jurisdictions significant enough
to put counsel on notice that the judge would like to share counsel's
knowledge before ruling.
54. CPR D.R. 7-106(B)(1).
55. See ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 280 (1949).
56. See, eg., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78

(1970).
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Differing Testimony Under Oath.

Jones' successful objections to several of the evidentiary offers of
the district attorney raise interesting issues. Jones was able to block
the district attorney's attempt to introduce evidence of Smith's testimony at the suppression hearing that he lived at the mobile home and
intended to return before the lease expired in two weeks, a statement
directly in conflict with Smith's testimony at the trial that he had left
town before the robbery and never planned to return. As a result, the
jury was not aware that Smith had told a different story under oath in
the same case.
The tactic seems permissible. Defense counsel did nothing more
than the law of evidence permits. The prosecutor probably would
have been able to obtain admission of the evidence if he had proceeded
differently. 7 Again, the wisdom of permitting a defendant in a criminal case to tell one story in a suppression hearing and another at a trial
on the merits, and then to prevent the inconsistency from being revealed to the jury, seems questionable, but a defendant may do so
under existing law, at least when the district attorney proceeds as he
did in this case.
E. Suppression.
Judge Frankel would impose an ethical obligation on counsel to
question witnesses with a purpose and design to elicit the whole truth.58
This approach seems unwise. If we want to learn all a witness knows,
that is, "supplementary and qualifying matters that render evidence already given more accurate, intelligible or fair than it otherwise would
be,"59 the remedy should be to broaden discovery and to expand the
scope of cross-examination instead of placing the affirmative burden on
defense counsel. Presumably, it is immaterial who brings forth the evidence; what is important is that the full story be developed. The problem, again, is not professional ethics that permit counsel to develop less
than the whole truth; rather, the problem stems from the provisions of
our procedural law that prevent an opponent from learning what has
not been brought forth and that prohibit questioning of witnesses beyond the scope of direct examination.60
57. See United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239 (1974); authorities cited at note 51 supra.
58. Frankel, supra note 13, at 1057.
59. Id. 1058.
60. Id. 1057. Judge Frankel also urges that the CPR be amended to require that a lawyer
report to the court and to opposing counsel when the lawyer does not intend to offer such evidence
or witnesses, "unless prevented from doing so by a privilege reasonably believed to apply." Id.
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The cardinal principle that should govern counsel's conduct is that
he may assert any right his client possesses under the law. The trial is
not a process of determining moral culpability according to abstract
principles of justice. It is a procedure to determine legal guilt in accordance with existing provisions of law. Counsel takes the law as he
finds it. The law requires the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt by competent evidence. Counsel has a right, and indeed a duty,
to insist that guilt be determined according to that law.
The same principle should govern the other more controversial actions by Jones: his failure to reveal the intimidated eyewitness and the
gun used in the robbery; his cross-examination of Roberts while believing that Roberts was telling the truth; and his cross-examination of Edwards while knowing that Edwards was telling the truth.
The failure to reveal incriminating evidence is sometimes referred
to as the "suppression issue." The issue in the hypothetical case has
been phrased with some care. The attorney did not participate in the
intimidation of the witness; he did not even know of the incident until
near the end of the trial. He did not hide the guns, nor did he suggest
directly or indirectly that they be hidden. He learned of both matters
in confidence. Active involvement by a lawyer in the concealment of
evidence, no matter how cautiously accomplished, is undoubtedly unethical and, depending upon state law, may constitute an obstruction of
justice even when the suppression arises out of a confidential communication.6" The more difficult question is posed when the attorney does
nothing either to encourage concealment or to reveal it.
A strong argument can be made for the proposition that Jones
might be required to reveal such matters if discovery permitted the
state to demand production of any gun in the possession of the defendIt is unclear whether the distinguished judge is talking about the privilege of confidential communications, the privilege against self-incrimination, or both.
61. See In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va.), af'd, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967); cf.
Clark v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 187, 195, 261 S.W.2d 339, 347, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 855 (1953)
(conversation between attorney and client, in which attorney advised client to dispose of murder
weapon, admissible upon testimony of eavesdropper because "not in the legitimate course of professional employment in making or preparing a defense"); State v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 833,
394 P.2d 681, 684 (1964) (though attorney may not be required to testify without client's consent, court stated "[w]e do not . . . imply that evidence can be permanently
withheld ... under ... the attorney-client privilege. [W]e must consider the balancing process between the attorney-client privilege and the public interest in criminal investigation"). But
Vf. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 479 (1974), reprintedin 22 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2537 (1978) (lawyer not required to reveal client's admissions
of other crimes). See also Callan & David, supra note 17, at 382; Comment, LegalEthics: Confdentialily and the Case of Robert Garrow's Lawyers, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 211 (1975); Comment,

The Right of a CriminalDefense Attorney to Withhold PhysicalEvidence Receivedfrom His Client,
38 CHI. L. REv. 211 (1970).
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ant or to demand names and addresses of any witnesses having knowledge of the crime as part of the process conferring equal or broader
discovery rights upon the defendant. The argument against an obligation to comply under these circumstances would probably be grounded
on the fifth amendment, but whether it would prevail after recent cases
narrowing the coverage of this amendment 62 is at least open to conjecture. The point is that if there should be any obligation of counsel to
volunteer evidence prejudicial to his client's interest learned in confidence, such an obligation should depend upon a procedure in which
the state requests such evidence in compliance with constitutional
standards.
The failure to reveal does, of course, reduce the likelihood of the
truth emerging from the trial (or, at least, the likelihood of its being
reflected in the jury's verdict). However, a distinction should be made
between counsel's obligation not to take action that will suppress the
truth or mislead the jury, in the absence of special justification, and an
obligation to take affirmative action to produce additional evidence for
the jury's consideration.63 Certainly, no such obligation should exist
until the dimensions of the fifth amendment are more clearly defined.
To require revelation of evidence by a defendant through his counsel in
the absence of a reciprocal right of discovery might well constitute a
violation of the fifth amendment. Defense counsel should not have the
obligation of determining the coverage of the fifth amendment as he
would under Judge Frankel's proposal. As Disciplinary Rule 7-109(A)
suggests, a lawyer unethically suppresses only when he or his client has
a legal obligation to reveal or produce. 64 The source of any legal obligation should be the procedural law of the state, not the ethics of the
profession.
F. Cross-Examination.
Effective cross-examination of a witness known or believed to be
telling the truth raises one of Dean Freedman's Three Hardest Questions. 65 In the hypothetical, you will recall that Roberts was crossexamined on the basis of a fifteen-year-old conviction for a crime unre62. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970); cf Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973) (reciprocal discovery of alibi evidence is required by fundamental fairness); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972) (statute requiring defendant to testify before any other defense testimony is heard if he is ever to do so violates the

privilege against self-incrimination). See also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976);
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
63. See Uviller, supra note 13.

64. CPR D.R. 7-109(A).
65. See note 6 supra.
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lated to veracity under circumstances where the revelation of the crime
might seriously injure his reputation and security, and where the judgment of several jurors concerning his credibility might well be affected
by proof of the conviction. He was also cross-examined on the basis of
his capacity to observe the incident related on direct examination, although his testimony on direct was not at all inconsistent with the story
that had been related to Jones by the defendant. Edwards' credibility,
too, was impeached when Jones showed the possibility of bias growing

out of his deal with the district attorney and on the basis of prior convictions.
The Code speaks to this issue only in a most general and ambiguous passage that prohibits advancing a "defense that is unwarranted
under existing law."66 The ABA Standards Relating to the Defense
Function would seem to condemn Jones' behavior. Section 7.6(b) provides:
A lawyer's belief that the witness is telling the truth does not
necessarily preclude appropriate cross-examination in all circumstances, but may affect the method and scope of cross-examination.
He should not misuse the power of cross-examination or impeachment by employing it to discredit or
67undermine a witness if he knows
the witness is testifying truthfully.
Clearly, the Standard is specifically directed at Dean Freedman's conclusion that such conduct is justified, although there is no reference to
Dean Freedman's article in the commentary or bibliography of the
Standards.
In my judgment, Dean Freedman's conclusion is correct as a matter of principle.68 A defendant should be convicted only if the state
proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Cross-examination is one
of the most important techniques available for creating a reasonable
doubt. Indeed, prior to the nineteenth century reforms that made a
defendant competent to testify, cross-examination was sometimes the
only weapon available.
66. CPR D.R. 7-102(A)(2). Even then, counsel may advance a claim if it can be supported

by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. See Thode,
Canons 6 and 7 The Lawyer-Client .Relationshp,48 TEx. L. REv.367 (1970).
67. ABA STANDARDS 7.6(b); cf State v. Fleury, Ill N.H. 294, 282 A.2d 873 (1971) (defend-

ant not denied effective trial counsel based on attorney's failure on cross-examination to ask questions that would have elicited only repetitive testimony damaging to defendant; no need to press
objections to pre-trial identification process where other procedures clearly establish validity of
the identification).
68. Compare Burger, supra note 9, with Bowman, Standards of Conductfor Prosecutionand
Defense Personnel 4n 4ttorney's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 28 (1966); compare N.Y. County
Opin. 43 (1914), quotedin V. COuNTRYMAN, T. FINMAN & T. SCHNEYER, THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY 291 (2d ed. 1976) with CPR D.R. 7-106(c)(2).
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Counsel should be allowed to ask any questions permitted by the
law of evidence in his efforts to test the observation, recollection and
credibility of the witness. He fulfills his obligation to the court when
he takes care not to ask questions forbidden under the law of evidence.
He fulfills his obligation to his client when he asks any legally permissible question, the answer to which may raise a reasonable doubt in the
mind of a juror. He owes no obligation to the witness except to examine him according to law. Indeed, the CPR specifically provides
that a lawyer shall not intentionally fail to seek the lawful objectives of
his client (that is, to create a reasonable doubt) through reasonably
available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules.6 9
Indeed, counsel's right to proceed in this manner may be viewed as
the converse of the prohibition against asking a question, the answer to
which is inadmissible, or intentionally violating an established rule of
evidence,70 tactics sometimes employed for the purpose of suggesting
the improper material to the jury with full knowledge that an instruction to disregard the question will be ineffective. Moral certainty of
guilt by counsel is not the equivalent of a jury verdict. Matters that
will mitigate moral culpability are frequently inadmissible under the
law of evidence, and it is unprofessional for a lawyer to allude to any
such matters.7" The underlying reason is that the trial must be conducted under a set of rules. If those rules permit a certain form of
cross-examination, there is no convincing reason why it should not be
used.
Part of the problem is again one of evidence, not ethics. Few students of the criminal process believe that a fifteen-year-old conviction
of an offense unrelated to veracity has any significant impact on the
credibility of a witness. Most recognize that proof of such stale prior
convictions should not affect credibility, may needlessly injure the reputation of the witness and frequently will be misused by the jury.7 2
One alternative is to exclude proof of such convictions. A second is to
entrust their admissibility to the discretion of the judge and concomitantly to charge him with the responsibility of balancing the value to be
69. CPR D.R. 7-101(A)(1). The only exceptions provided for in the Disciplinary Rules are
(1) where permissible, a lawyer may exercise his professional judgment to waive or fail to assert a

right or position of a client and (2) a lawyer may refuse to aid or participate in conduct that he
believes to be unlawful.
70. CPR D.R. 7-106(C)(1), D.R. 7-106(C)(7); f CPR D.R. 7-106(C)(2) (question that is intended to degrade a witness or other person).
71. CPR D.R. 7-106(C)(1).
72. See FED. R. EvID. 609(b); Ladd, CredibilityTests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REV.
166, 176-77 (1940).
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gained against the losses suffered by their use.73 The first approach
might have prohibited the use of convictions to impeach Roberts (the
janitor) or Edwards (the robber); the latter probably would have protected only Roberts. The supposed issue of ethics would be much less
significant if different rules of evidence prevailed.
There is understandably a desire to avoid the conclusion that a
lawyer can do anything not prohibited by rules of evidence or procedure or law. Thus, the argument is advanced that a cross-examination
may be proper when a lawyer believes the witness is untruthful, inaccurate in recollection or narration, or has told less than the whole story,
but not when the lawyer believes (or knows) that the witness has honestly narrated an accurate version of the events he perceived.74 The
argument is persuasive in that it presumes a model of professional deportment in which the attorney adheres to a quest for abstract justice.
The fallacy lies in the relationship between the standard of proof required for conviction and the function of defense counsel in challenging all evidence adduced by the state in the effort to meet that standard.
A defendant should be convicted only when the prosecution's case, after subjection to the kind of cross-examination permitted by law, establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no way to ascertain
whether such a level of proof has been reached if counsel declines to
cross-examine because of his personal belief in the credibility of the
state's witness.
There are pragmatic reasons for permitting cross-examination of
Roberts' capacity to observe and of Edwards' honesty. Jones' belief
that Smith was in the car may be wrong because both Smith and Roberts may be lying. Edwards may be telling a story that is basically true,
but he may have embellished it to ensure the favorable treatment he
has bargained for in exchange for his testimony. The appearance created by Jones' attack on the witnesses is troubling, but on balance his
conduct was justified.
73. See Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965); FED. R. EvtD. 609.
74. Perhaps the most eloquent expression of this view is found in H. MACMILLAN, LAW &
OTHER THINGS

(1937):

Again, suppose that your opponent's leading witness has to your knowledge many
years ago been guilty of some offence, but has long outlived it and by honourable conduct completely wiped out all public recollection of it. Your client perhaps urges you to
ask him in cross-examination a question reviving this long-erased blot upon his escutcheon in order to discredit his present evidence. What are you to do? If the witness to the
best of your judgment is giving his evidence truthfully and fairly, you will decline to deal
a cowardly blow at him through his past.
Id. 192.
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G. Social Sciences and Voir Dire.
The use of the psychological profile and similar techniques drawn
from the social sciences poses yet another problem. 7" Lawyers have
always attempted to select jurors believed either to be favorably disposed to their clients' causes or individuals to whom they can "sell a
case." Only recently, however, have social science techniques been
utilized to determine the identity of jurors whose attitudes about and
approaches to a wide range of issues will predispose them to vote in a
certain manner on a particular case. The practice has been defended
as a return to the early concept of a jury in which the defendant's
friends presumably sat with others from the neighborhood, as a necessity to combat prejudice and as a desirable reinforcement of the presumption of innocence. Whatever its rationale, the profile, when
considered with the substantial number of peremptory challenges made
available to a defendant in a felony case, makes it possible for defense
counsel to minimize the dangers of conviction to a much greater degree
than if jurors were chosen without knowledge of their attitudes and
prejudices. The result is a defendant's jury rather than the cross-section of the community that is more likely to occur when such techniques are not used. It is one thing to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt to a jury which is "impartial" or which reflects a cross-section of
the community. It is quite another to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt when the jurors selected are biased in favor of a defendant,
the cause he represents or the defense he will assert.
Psychological profiles have been used in such celebrated "political" trials as the Angela Davis, the Joan Little and the Mitchell-Stans
cases;76 similarly, defense counsel conducted thorough investigations of
prospective jurors' backgrounds in the Daniel Ellsberg case. As a
practical matter, such techniques increase the government's burden regardless of the formal standard of proof. Thus far, the costs have been
so great that use of the technique has been infrequent and has been
confined to "political" cases. If the practice becomes more routine, it
may constitute another threat to the likelihood that the jury's verdict
will accurately reflect the defendant's guilt or innocence.
There are some who argue that the jury is a political institution
and that the verdict properly reflects the prejudices of the community
(at least if the jury acquits).77 The problem is of much greater signifi75. For a brief and provocative discussion, see McConahay, Mullin & Frederick, supra note
31, at 221-24.
76.

See id. 205.

77. See Van Dyke, The Jury as a PoliticalLnstitution, 16 CATH. LAW. 224 (1970). See also
M. KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM
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cance for those who believe that the jury should reflect a cross-section
of the community and that it should, insofar as possible, find the facts
with scrupulous adherence to the instructions of the court.78 The ABA
Standards come no closer to the problem than asserting that a lawyer
should restrict himself to investigatory methods that will not harass or
unnecessarily embarrass potential jurors nor invade their privacy and,
whenever possible, should restrict his investigation to records and
sources of information already in existence.79
This is another area where permissible constraints are more properly within the domain of procedural law than of professional ethics.
Prohibitions against the use of a psychological profile or investigation
of the backgrounds of jurors may well be unconstitutional. But there
are other ways to deal with the problems if the frequency of use endangers the vitality of the jury system. Peremptory challenges may be reduced; legislation to protect the privacy of jurors and records may be
expanded;80 concepts of venue may be modified. We should not deal
with the problem by attempting to preclude counsel from taking action
that is lawful under existing procedures.
H. Perjury and Confidentiality.
There are other areas in which Jones' conduct is much less defensible. It is one thing to fail to reveal the identity of a witness, to crossexamine a witness believed to be truthful and to suppress evidence unlawfully seized; it is completely another to suborn perjury in any form.
Jones' conduct in lecturing Smith concerning the legal consequences of
different versions of what might have taken place was no more or less
than a suggestion of the story that Smith should then relate.8 ' It was
intended to produce the version of the facts related by Smith and was
obviously so perceived by him.
The reason for Jones' approach is likewise obvious. He might feel
uncomfortable if he were required to call Smith to the stand to testify
to a story that Smith had earlier denied. Jones is in a much better
position from the point of view of his conscience and of his ultimate
success if he can start with a story that, if believed, will justify an acquittal. Smith also is happier if he can provide such testimony.
LEGAL RULE (1973); Kaufman, The A'ght of Self-Representation and the Power of Jury
NullpFcation,28 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 269 (1978).
78. See Christie, Lawful Departuresfrom Legal Rules: "JuryNullflcation" and Legitimated
Disobedience,62 CAL. L. REv. 1289 (1974).
79. ABA STANDARDS 7.2(b).
80. See Babcock, Voir Dire "Preserving "Its WonderfulPower," 27 STAN. L. REv. 545 (1975)

(arguing for expansion of voir dire and limiting private investigation of jurors).
81.

See G. HLzARD, supra note 21, at 128.
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It clearly would make a better battle in many cases if the defendant had help in fabricating his story. The problem is that we are seeking not a good fight but an honest statement of the events as perceived
by the witness. The ABA Standard is clearly correct when it states:
It is unprofessional conduct for the lawyer to instruct the client
or to intimate to him in any way that he should not be candid in
revealing facts so as to afford the lawyer free rein to take action
82
which would be precluded by the lawyer's knowing of such facts.

The proper conduct of counsel when the defendant tells his lawyer
he committed the crime, but indicates his intention to deny complicity
when he testifies, poses a different problem. Dean Freedman concludes that in such a situation counsel should advise the client to tell
the truth, but may then call the client to the stand, elicit the perjury and
urge the jury to believe the perjury because to do otherwise "would be
a betrayal of the assurances of confidentiality given by the attorney in
order to induce the client to reveal everything, however damaging it
might appear."8 3 The problem is that to permit such conduct would
clearly undermine the adjudicatory process.
There is no vital difference between a lawyer suborning perjury
from his client and a lawyer suborning perjury from another witness.
Nor is the source of his knowledge of the perjury fundamental. Obviously, a prohibition against a lawyer suborning perjury from witnesses
who are not his clients when he knows the truth from nonconfidential
sources poses a less difficult problem. Dean Freedman apparently
agrees that it would be unprofessional to call a witness, other than a
member of the defendant's family, to testify to what is known to be a
lie, although he would justify the attorney's facilitation of lying by
close family members.8 4
What is it that excludes the defendant and close members of the
family from the normal operation of the rule? We are told in substance that it is simply too much to expect people faced with criminal
prosecution not to lie and that such persons need the absolute protection of confidential communications to bolster them in their contest
with a hostile system. Defendants, it is said, will be less likely to tell
the truth if they realize that the truth may limit their defense, and, unless they tell the truth, defense counsel may be unaware of salient
points that may be available to assist them. In short, it is asserted that
the level of protection that the state should afford the individual is one
that permits the defendant to have his cake and eat it too: he may tell
82. ABA STANDARDS 3.2(b).
83. M. FREEDmAN,supra note 17, at 31.
84. Id. 32.
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the truth in order that the lawyer can use those portions of it that may
be helpful, but he may also lie if the truth alone is inadequate to assure
his acquittal. The lawyer may help him to make the lie more plausible
by adroitly examining him and by arguing that he is a credible witness.
Clearly, the confidential relationship is of immense significance to
the operation of our system. But there is nothing in the history of the
evidentiary privilege or of the professional obligation to suggest that it
was designed to cloak active participation in the facilitation of perjury.
A conclusion that a lawyer may immunize himself from professional
responsibility for subornation by telling his client that his' conduct is
unlawful lacks a basis in authority or reason. Whether or not he has
previously cautioned a client to tell the truth, when an attorney calls
the client to the stand knowing that he will lie, the attorney willfully
procures perjury.
A broader justification for counsel calling any witness (including
but not limited to the defendant) when he knows he will tell a falsehood is predicated upon the proposition that counsel is not required to
be the judge of the credibility of any witness, including his client. It is
argued that the trial is not a search for "truth" in the abstract, but is
rather an effort to persuade the trier of fact that it should resolve the
dispute by adoption of some version of the facts as testified to by witnesses. Such an approach is asserted to be consistent with the position
the cross-examination of a
taken earlier in this Article, which justified
85
witness known to be telling the truth.
Advocates of this approach would argue that counsel should advise witnesses and clients to testify only to what they believe in their
own minds to be the truth and warn them of the pains of perjury and of
the danger of effective cross-examination of a witness who is not truthful. After such warnings, the lawyer has arguably fulfilled his duty.
He should not attempt to judge credibility but should permit the witthen attempt to persuade
ness to relate any story the witness desires and
6
the jury to believe the testimony elicited.
There is obvious appeal in such an analysis. Counsel is relieved
of any ethical responsibility if a witness chooses to lie. Undoubtedly,
defense counsel will sometimes be more successful than would have
been the case if he could not have produced witnesses to testify about a
defense that counsel knows did not exist.
85. See text accompanying notes 65-74 supra.
86. This argument was eloquently advanced as a hypothesis deserving careful attention in a
letter from Justice James G. Exum, Jr. of the Supreme Court of North Carolina to the author

(Dec. 1, 1977) (on file at Duke Law Journal.
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The problem is that in some situations lawyers do "know" what in
fact took place. When they do, the moral responsibility for producing
testimony to the contrary is quite different from when counsel is ignorant of the true state of facts, or even when he believes (but does not
know) that the facts are different from the version of the facts that the
witness is prepared to relate. Knowledge simply brings with it moral
consequences that are not present in its absence.
Furthermore, it is frankly impossible to explain to the public why
a lawyer should be permitted to present with impunity evidence he
knows to be false. It makes little difference whether the evidence is
live testimony or a document. The public expects that the conduct of
lawyers in a courtroom will be at least equal to the behavior expected
of laymen in the ordinary affairs of life. To examine a witness who is
telling a story under oath that the witness and the lawyer know to be
false does not meet the minimum standard of conduct.
It is submitted that the lawyer should lay out the ground rules that
will govern his representation at his first conference with the defendant:
he will ask his client to relate his version of the facts. Counsel will not
permit him to take the stand and testify to facts that the defendant has
told counsel did not take place. After hearing the defendant's version,
the lawyer will conduct his own investigation. If the lawyer's investigation of the case reveals evidence that tends to refute the defendant's
story, and he concludes that the defendant's story will not be believed,
he will so inform the defendant. If the defendant recants, the lawyer
will then either attempt to negotiate a favorable plea agreement with
the prosecutor or go to trial with the hope of preventing the government from meeting its burden of proof. If the defendant adheres to his
story, counsel will proceed to trial, permit the defendant to testify if he
so desires, and argue his version of the facts to the jury. Counsel will
not, however, permit the defendant to change his version of the facts to
meet the discovered unfavorable evidence. If the defendant either
before or during trial changes his story and attempts to testify to a version of the facts earlier denied (unless this version of the facts is substantiated by counsel's independent investigation), counsel will seek to
withdraw from the case. The client should be told that the lawyer's
action in seeking to withdraw may or may not be permitted by the
court and may have substantial impact upon the sentence imposed in
the event of conviction.
Such caution at the beginning of representation might reduce the
level of trust that the client has in counsel. It should. The client at the
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beginning should know that his lawyer is a "hired gun";87 he is a professional who will zealously represent him, though only within certain
limits. The client should be informed of the scope of these limits.
This approach might also encourage some clients to lie initially. I
doubt that this would occur frequently in cases involving a first offense,
but more experienced defendants might well prefer to take a chance at
acquittal by lying rather than accept the more limited defense that
would be permitted if they were truthful. The price they will pay is
that their counsel may be unprepared for some facets of the case because the defendants have failed to reveal the information counsel
needs for adequate preparation.
No fundamental harm to the attorney-client relationship would result from such a practice. A client would simply be informed that the
relationship, and the privilege designed to further it, do not go so far as
to authorize the assistance of the attorney in the commission of future
offenses-a traditional limitation that has never excluded perjury from
8
its coverage.
Concededly, some see a problem when a lawyer presents the testimony of a defendant whom he believes (but does not know) to be lying.
Judge Frankel apparently equates cases in which an advocate has been
informed directly by a competent client of his guilt with those in which
counsel has, from other evidence too clear to admit of genuine doubt,
learned that his client's position rests upon a falsehood. 89 The cases
are distinguishable. There is a great deal of difference between a lawyer calling to the stand a defendant who has asserted his innocence,
although the other evidence in the case persuades the lawyer of his
probable guilt, and the same lawyer calling a defendant to the stand
when the defendant has told the lawyer that he will lie. The principle
that a lawyer should not call a client to the stand when he knows he
will lie applies only to the situation where the client has told the lawyer
that X is true, but that he will testify to Y, and the lawyer's independent investigation establishes that X is true. If his client tells him from
87. See Dash, The Emerging Role andFunction ofthe CriminalDefense Lawyer, 47 N.C. L.
REV. 598, 630 (1969).
88. See CPR D.R. 7-102(A)(7) (lawyer shall not "counsel or assist his client in conduct that

the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent"); E.C. 7-5 (lawyer may not "knowingly assist the
client to engage in illegal conduct"); ABA STANDARDS 3.7(b) (unprofessional conduct for lawyer

to "counsel his client in or knowingly assist his client to engage in conduct which the lawyer
believes to be illegal").
89. Frankel, supra note 13, at 1039; cf CPR D.R. 1-102(A)(4) (lawyer shall not engage in
conduct "involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation"); D.R. 1-102(A)(5) (lawyer
shall not engage in conduct "that is prejudicial to the administration of justice").
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the beginning that Y is true, the lawyer should be able to call the witness to testify to Y, even if the attorney is convinced to a moral certainty that Y is untrue. The impact on the jury may be the same, but
the ethical posture of the lawyer is quite different. 90
It is my understanding that this is what is meant by the CPR's
prohibition that a lawyer shall not "knowingly use perjured testimony" 91 and by the Code of Trial Conduct of the American College of
Trial Lawyers' provision that "[a] confidential disclosure of guilt alone
does not require a withdrawal from the case, but he [the lawyer] should
never offer testimony which he knows to be false."'92 As long as the
defendant asserts his innocence, the lawyer should assist him in
presenting his case to those with the responsibility of determining guilt
or innocence. The attorney should not prejudge guilt in any case except where facts establishing guilt are admitted by the defendant and
confirmed by his investigation.
In a retained case, if the client plans to give testimony the lawyer
knows to be false, he frequently will be able to withdraw. In some
cases the client may be candid with his second counsel to avoid the
possibility of another withdrawal; in others he may lie at his initial conference with the second lawyer. In the latter case, the same story may
be presented to the jury as if the first counsel had remained in the case
and permitted the defendant to relate a story that he knew to be false.
But professional responsibility should be determined not by what the
jury hears but by the knowledge and behavior of counsel. The argument that the likelihood of perjury is greater because the new counsel is
ignorant of the falsehood, and therefore not in a position to discourage
the client from presenting it, is specious. If the first attorney could not
prevail upon the defendant to tell the truth, there is no reason to believe the second would have been more successful.
If the defendant is an indigent and the motion for leave to withdraw is made substantially before trial, the motion will be granted in
90. See Thode, supra note 66, at 369-70. "D.R. 7-102(A)(1) makes clear that not only what
a lawyer does, but why he does it is relevant to a determination of whether he is acting 'within the
bounds of the law."' Id. Another distinction would also be appropriate. A lawyer might believe his client is about to commit peIjury, but have no firm factual basis for the belief. Discus-

sion of his conjecture with the trial court in these circumstances would clearly be improper. See
United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977).
91. CPR D.R. 7-102(A)(4) (emphasis added).
92. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, CODE OF TRIAL CONDUCT 4(a) (1972 rev.)
(emphasis added); Vl Gold, Split Loyalty: An EthicalProblemforthe CriminalDefense Lawyer, 14
CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 65 (1965) (attorney must preserve duty to client by avoiding court's improper
questions requiring candid answers and by not volunteering information detrimental to client).
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many cases. It is true that in a single-judge court the judge will probably be aware of the cause of the motion without any confidence being
revealed. This is not an unfair price to be exacted from a defendant
who insists upon pursuing his efforts at perjury. In a multi-judge
court, even this disadvantage may not exist.
A motion for leave to withdraw on the eve of trial may well be
denied. It is not disingenuous to urge that counsel should move for
leave to withdraw, while recognizing the likelihood of denial of the motion.93 The point is that counsel should manifest to the court that he is
unable both to represent this defendant effectively and to adhere to the
Disciplinary Rule that admonishes him not to "knowingly use perjured
testimony or false evidence." 94
It is not inappropriate that a motion for leave to withdraw in such
a situation "passes on" the problem to the judge. 9 He must balance
the disadvantages of delay and the possibility of perjury at a later trial
against the probability of perjury if the motion is denied. If we begin
to place more emphasis upon the avoidance of perjury and less on
docket delay, we might find more withdrawals permitted and more defendants who -having learned of the consequences of their insistence
upon perjury-think twice before insisting upon it. If a judge denies
the motion, he has in effect ruled that the danger of perjury is outweighed by the need to proceed expeditiously.
Much the same problem is involved when the client "spins" 96 his
counsel at trial, as Smith did to Jones. Here, the ABA Standard asserts
that the lawyer should make a record of what has happened without
revealing the matter to the court.97 A far better procedure would require counsel to move for leave to withdraw and permit the court to
declare a mistrial. Again, the responsibility should be borne by the trial
judge. If the court believes the danger of perjury is less important than
continuing with the case, the court may so rule. A mistrial in such a
situation should not bar retrial.9"
The ABA Standard also adopts the position that if a pretrial motion to withdraw is denied, or if the problem arises at trial, it is unprofessional for the lawyer to examine the witness in the conventional
93. Contra, M. FREEDMAN, supra note 17, at 34.
94. CPR D.R. 7-102(A)(4).
95. But see People v. Brown, 54 Ill. 2d 21, 294 N.E.2d 285 (1973), to the effect that "the
lawyer is obligated not to present testimony that he is satified is not true, and he cannot call upon
the trial judge to make the decision for him." Id. at 24, 294 N.E. 2d at 287.
96. "Spinning" describes the situation in which a witness relates a story to counsel on the
stand quite different from the one he related to counsel before trial.

97. ABA

STANDARDS

7.7(c).

98. See McKissick v. United States, 398 F.2d 342, 344 (5th Cir. 1968).
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manner and later argue that the defendant's known false version of the
facts is worthy of belief.9 9 By this criterion, Jones' behavior was un-

ethical. But it is submitted that Jones behaved properly and that the
ABA Standard is unwise.
If the court determines that the case should proceed, counsel
should be authorized to act as he normally would, examining his client
and arguing the client's version of facts to the jury. He should not

abandon his client, in substance leaving the client unrepresented, which
would be the certain result of compliance with the ABA Standard.I °°
Perjured testimony will occur, but the lawyer will have met his
responsibility by asking to be relieved from participating in it. The
court will have, as it should have, the obligation of determining

whether society is best served by ordering a mistrial or by permitting
the perjury to take place. The defendant will not be left unrepresented
but may be deterred by the knowledge that, if convicted, he will be
sentenced by the judge who required his counsel to continue with
knowledge that counsel preferred to be relieved for ethical reasons.

Neither the suggested approach nor that of the ABA goes as far as
that apparently advocated by at least one court of appeals in McKissick
99. ABA

STANDARDS

7.7(c).

100. Professor Addison Bowman has argued that the system should not countenance a process
in which defense counsel is required to present his client's testimony in a fashion that may lead the
jury to believe that counsel does not believe his client. See Bowman, supra note 68, at 30. Professor Bowman's position is supported by State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976). In
Robinson, discord developed between the defendant and his court-appointed counsel because of
counsel's refusal to be a party to the introduction of what he reasonably believed to be perjured
testimony. The defendant indicated that he did not wish to be represented by counsel. The trial
court declined to relieve counsel, but indicated that it would not require counsel to examine a
witness who counsel thought would lie. The witness was called, and counsel conducted preliminary examination leading up to the events that gave rise to the prosecution. At that point, counsel
told the witness, "Tell what you would like to tell." The witness told her story, at which point the
defendant personally took over the examination of the witness with counsel seated at the counsel
table. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the defendant had been denied due process of law, noting that "[t]his procedure could hardly have failed to convey to the jury the impression that the defendant's counsel attached little significance or credibility to the testimony of the
witness, or that the defendant and his counsel were at odds. Prejudice to the defendant's case by
this trial tactic was inevitable." Id. at 67, 224 S.E.2d at 180. But see People v. Lowery, 52 I11.
App. 3d 44,47,366 N.E.2d 155, 157 (1977), approving the ABA Standard. The Robinson case has
been criticized on the ground that it precludes a "compromise solution" between facilitating
perjury by the client and revealing the client's confidence.
See Note, Professional
Responsibilit-North Carolina's View of the Lawyer and the PerjuriousWitness, 55 N.C. L. REV.
321 (1977). The problem of appropriate procedure in the situation with which Standard 7.7 deals
has been the subject of other cases, none of which provides a definitive answer. See State v.
Lowery, Ill Ariz. 26, 523 P.2d 54 (1974); Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429 (D.C.), cert.
denied,429 U.S. 1024 (1976); People v. McCalvin, 55 Ill. 2d 161, 163-65, 302 N.E.2d 342, 344-45
(1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974) (prior to Lowery). The cases are discussed in Polster,
supra note 17, at 18-29, along with a criticism of Standard 7.7.
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McKissick, a defendant who was tried on an inforv. United States.'
mation that charged him with selling drugs without prescription in violation of federal law, took the stand and testified. At the conclusion of
his testimony, the trial judge commented: "This is the worst case of
perjury in this case I have ever seen since I have been on the Bench; the
drug agent or this witness, one, did it. I don't know who; I don't know
which one of them did it."' 2 The next morning, before the jury retired, counsel requested a conference in chambers and in the presence
of the prosecutor revealed to the judge that McKissick had told him,
after testifying, that the testimony was false. Counsel stated that under
these circumstances he did not feel that he could continue to represent
McKissick and asked for a mistrial. The trial judge stated that he saw
no alternative except to grant a mistrial because of the withdrawal of
counsel. A mistrial was declared and McKissick, represented by a different counsel, was retried. On appeal from this conviction, he
claimed double jeopardy. The court of appeals dismissed the claim of
double jeopardy, holding there was "manifest justification or necessity"
for the mistrial. It observed that the defendant "had no constitutional
right, overriding the public interest, to have his case determined by a
tribunal whose processes he had himself thus frustrated and
abused."' 1 3 On the question of the propriety of defense counsel's behavior, the court stated:
If the appellant told his attorney that he had committed perjury,
that offense was in effect a continuing one so long as allowed to remain in the record to influence the jury's verdict. Whether appellant
did or did not specifically authorize or direct his attorney to make it
known to the court, or even directed it not be made known, he could
not abrogate the attorney's discharge of his professional, ethical and
public duty to report it. The statement was good cause to the attorney to withdraw from the case, and he would have been subject to
discipline had he continued in the defense without making a report
to the court. The attorney not only could, but was obliged to, make
the perjured
such disclosure to the court as necessary to withdraw
4
testimony from the consideration of the jury.1
The court went on to decide that, while counsel acted properly in
informing the court of his client's perjury, he should not have sought
the mistrial, and that the revelation of the client's perjury by the lawyer
should not have occurred in the absence of the client. It remanded the
case to the district court to determine if there had been a waiver or if
the constitutional error was nonprejudicial. On remand, the district
101.
102.
103.
104.

379 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1967), discussedin Polster, supra note 17, at 16-18.
379 F.2d at 758.
Id. at 761.
Id.
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court found no waiver and no injury. A different panel of the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the judgment.10 5 A petition for rehearing en bane was
denied.' 06 Thus, six judges of the circuit approved the conduct of
counsel and no active judge on the court of appeals sought a rehearing
en bane.
In McKissick the perjury occurred before the lawyer had knowledge of the falsehood, but also before the jury had begun its deliberations. McKissick thus falls between the more classic cases where a
perjury is learned of either after the proceedings are terminated or
before the witness is called. It seems clear, however, that in the Fifth
Circuit, counsel should not only seek leave to withdraw but should explicitly disclose the falsehood directly to the court. Such a requirement
far and is, arguably, inconsistent with the attorney-client privigoes too
07
lege.'
In 1975 the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility grappled in Formal Opinion 341 with the apparent conflict between the lawyer's duty of candor to the court and his obligation to
protect confidences. The Code now provides:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that (1) His
client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud

upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall
reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal, except° when the
information is protected as a privileged communication. 0
The Committee concluded that the tradition of the bar that permits a lawyer to assure a client that information (whether a confidence
or not) given to the firm will not be revealed to third parties is so important that it should take precedence in all but the most serious cases.
The scope of confidences protected against mandatory disclosure is
thus broader than the scope of those protected by the attorney-client
privilege in the law of evidence. Exceptions are made for confidences
or secrets the revelation of which is required by law or court order and
for the intention of a client to commit a crime. The thrust of the opin105. McKissick v. United States, 398 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968) (district court findings reported

by appellate court, id. at 343).

106. Id. at 344; accord, Poister, supra note 17, at 33-39, wherein it is argued that the lawyer

should reveal the perjury to the court. Professor Wolfram is also in agreement.

See Wolfram,

supra note 17, at 868-70.
107. The reasons advanced for the privilege seem particularly pertinent to its operation in this
context. See 8 J. WIGMORE, ON EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughton ed. 1961); R. LEMPERT & S.
SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 616-20 (1977).

108. CPR D.R. 7-102(B)(1).

The background of Opin. 341 and the significance of the 1974

amendment to the Code are discussed in Note, ClientFraudand the Lawyer-.An Ethical.4na/ysi,

62 MiNN. L. REV. 89 (1977).
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ion is clear, however. The confidence will prevail in the event of a
conflict. The commentary to the ABA Standards 0 9 suggests that the
duty to keep the confidence may be accorded even greater significance
in criminal cases.110
V.

CONCLUSION

In summary, Jones should have informed the court of the unfavorable precedent and should not have engaged in the Anatomy of a
Murder technique" 11 prior to eliciting Smith's statement, but his other
conduct was justifiable. Nevertheless, his behavior will leave most dispassionate observers uneasy. Even when each individual action can be
justified, there is a gestalt effect in which the total is more than the sum
of the parts. The general picture is one of concerted activity aimed at
achieving a result that is not in the public interest. The reasons are
found partly in hard questions of ethics, but primarily in the law of
evidence, including, but not limited to, the exclusionary rule. A distorted picture is achieved when each ethical question is isolated from
the mosaic of which it is a part. Decisions concerning ethics cannot be
disassociated from the other factors affecting the manner in which guilt
will be determined. Presumably, there would be less concern if the
evidence relevant to Smith's guilt, which was properly excluded under
existing law, were available for jury consideration. The major source
of concern is the combined effect of excluding the sack, the admissions
of Smith, the eyewitness testimony and the prior inconsistent statement
of Smith, while at the same time permitting cross-examination of witnesses known to be truthful and eliciting testimony known to be perjured.
It is time to re-examine how far we are prepared to go in seeking
to accomplish in a criminal trial objectives other than the ascertainment of the truth of charges and defenses. As a part of this process,
society must examine the dimensions of the exclusionary rule and other
rules of evidence and procedure designed to assure that guilt or innocence is fairly determined. The profession must simultaneously examine our standards of professional responsibility in the light of the
impact of different alternatives upon the objectives we have chosen.
109. See ABA STANDARDS 7.7, Comment (Supp. 1971).
110. Whether courts will agree is at best conjectural. See State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231,
468 P.2d 136 (1970). See also Note, supra note 108.
111. R. TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MUtRDER 32-35 (1958). Counsel explains "the law" to a
client before ascertaining the client's version of the facts and does so in a manner that suggests
that one version of the facts is consistent with innocence and that another is compatible only with

guilt.
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There is, of course, an appealing symmetry in an approach that
urges that a lawyer should never assess credibility and, hence, has the
same range of tactics available to him in the defense of any2 client. The
weakness of this position has been discussed previously."
There is also symmetry and appeal in an approach that determines
what tactics a lawyer may employ on the basis of counsel's belief in the
justice of his cause, the integrity of his client or the honesty of a witness. Such a standard would clearly substitute the lawyer for the jury
in resolving some issues involving credibility. In other circumstances,
a standard of this nature would, as a practical matter, immunize a lawyer- himself protected by the attorney-client privilege-from effective
scrutiny, much less the imposition of sanctions by the profession.
Nevertheless, there are clear problems involved in the thesis advanced in this Article. There is concededly a thin line between
"belief" supported by overwhelming evidence and "knowledge" emanating from a client. There is also difficulty in distinguishing between
cross-examining a witness known.to be telling the truth and calling a
client to the stand with knowledge that he will tell a falsehood. Each
involves a foreseeable risk that the jury will be persuaded to accept a
version of the facts that counsel knows is untrue. Each tactic is employed with that precise objective.
To the author, there is a material difference between testing
whether the version of an event testified to by a witness who is honestly
attempting to describe what he perceived meets the normal standards
of perception, narration and factors affecting veracity, on the one hand,
and eliciting a direct falsehood from a witness by an attorney who
knows the witness is lying, on the other. The former is justified by the
interaction between the nature of the adversary system and the obligations of the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by testimony
that has met the test of cross-examination permitted by law. No similar justification exists for the latter. Again, many dispassionate observers will disagree.
Unfortunately, there was little debate about these and other
significant issues before the CPR was adopted by the ABA, and virtually none in most jurisdictions before it was incorporated into state law.
With due respect to the distinguished committee that drafted the ABA
Standards, too much effort was devoted to rebutting Dean Freedman's
heresies and not enough to providing a conceptual foundation for the
Standards adopted. Very few changes in the committee's recommen112. See text following note 86 supra.
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dations were made either in the Council of the Section of Criminal
Justice or in the House of Delegates.
In 1979 the ABA will convene a national conference to examine
the Code after its first decade. It is hoped that some of these issues will
be addressed.
The challenge is here. The public can justifiably question the wisdom of permitting the legal profession to regulate itself if it is unable to
meet the challenge forthrightly. If we do not want the role of a defense
lawyer to be characterized as a "suppressor of truth," it will be necessary to modify either our current law of procedure and evidence or our
code of ethics, or both. If the profession sees nothing wrong with the
existing model, it must articulate its reasons to an unsympathetic public.

Our criminal process has achieved spectacular heights in the protection of the rights of our citizenry. Appreciation of these achievements must be coupled with a continued recognition that the
ascertainment of truth remains an important fundamental value of our
system of criminal justice. To lose sight of this value may place the
legal profession in a posture similar to that of the English statesman
whose "logical mind, starting from false premises, arrived unerringly at
the wrong conclusion." '

113. H.

MACMILLAN, WINDS OF CHANGE

451 (1966).

